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Abstract. For the sake of practicability of cloud computing, fine-grained data ac-
cess is frequently required in the sense that users with different attributes should be
granted different levels of access privileges. However, most of existing access control
solutions are not suitable for resource-constrained users because of large computa-
tion costs, which linearly increase with the complexity of access policies. In this pa-
per, we present an access control system based on ciphertext-policy attribute-based
encryption. The proposed access control system enjoys constant computation cost
and is proven secure in the random oracle model under the decision Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman Exponent assumption. Our access control system supports AND-gate ac-
cess policies with multiple values and wildcards, and it can efficiently support direct
user revocation. Performance comparisons indicate that the proposed solution is
suitable for resource-constrained environment.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is a promising computing paradigm in which vast and scalable
resources are provided as services over the Internet. As the development of cloud
computing, users’ concerns about data security become main obstacles that impede
cloud computing from wide adoptions. However, traditional access control tech-
nologies are no longer suitable for cloud computing environment because the service
provider is fully trusted by users. In cloud computing, the data service manager is
not trusted by users and is assumed to be honest-but-curious, that is, it will honestly
execute the tasks assigned by legitimate participants in the system. Meanwhile, it
would like to learn secret information as much as possible.
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is known as an important tool for imple-
menting secure and fine-grained access control over untrusted cloud storage. In
an attribute-based system, access control over encrypted data is closely related to
attributes, which are used to describe users in the system and define fine-grained ac-
cess policies. There are two kinds of ABE constructions: key-policy ABE (KP-ABE)
and ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE). In a KP-ABE scheme, the access policy is
necessary for generation of attribute secret keys and ciphertexts are computed based
on a set of attributes. In CP-ABE, access policies are used to generate ciphertexts
and every secret key is corresponding to an attribute set. A user can successfully
decrypt a ciphertext only if the attribute set associated with the user’s secret key
matches the access policy specified for the ciphertext by data owners.
Although promising in designing fine-grained access control system in cloud com-
puting, efficiency challenges still remain there before ABE can be widely deployed in
practical cloud platforms. Specifically, the computation cost of most existing ABE
schemes linearly grows with the complexity of the access formula. The drawback
appears more serious in resource-constrained scenarios such as wireless sensors and
mobile phones. Moreover, an efficient revocation mechanism is necessary in secure
and scalable ABE systems.
Aiming at tackling the challenges described above, we present a fine-grained data
access control system in cloud computing, where CP-ABE serves as a fundamental
building block. The proposed access control system enjoys small and constant com-
putation cost and it can efficiently support direct user revocation. It is proved that
the system is secure against adaptively chosen ciphertexts attacks (CCA2) in the
random oracle model under the decision m-BDHE assumption, where m is an upper
bound of the total number of users in the system. Particularly, our access control
system enables AND-gate access policy with multiple attribute values and wild-
cards. Performance comparisons indicate that our solution is suitable for real-world
application scenarios where users are resource-constrained.
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2 RELATED WORK
The notion of ABE was introduced by Sahai and Waters [1] as a fuzzy identity-
based encryption, and was firstly dealt with by Goyal et al. [2]. There are two
complementary notions of ABE: KP-ABE and CP-ABE. The first KP-ABE con-
struction [2] realized the monotonic access structure for key policies, while the first
CP-ABE scheme supporting tree-based access structures in generic group models
was proposed by Bethencourt et al. [3]. To achieve enhanced security, Cheung and
Newport [4] presented a CP-ABE scheme supporting AND-gate policy with positive
and negative attribute values and wildcards in the standard model.
However, most existing ABE schemes are inefficient because the computation
overhead is linearly proportional to the complexity of access policies. In many real-
world application scenarios, users often have constrained computing power [5, 6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11] and cannot afford the computation cost of many previous ABE solu-
tions. Therefore, computationally efficient ABE schemes [12, 13, 14] have received
a lot of attention recently. Emura et al. [13] proposed a CP-ABE scheme, which
only needs three exponentiation and two pairing operations in encryption and de-
cryption phases, respectively. However, the scheme only supports AND-gate policies
with multiple values without wildcards. If a decryptor’s attributes are different from
the access policy, he/she cannot decrypt corresponding ciphertexts. Similarly, the
CP-ABE scheme [12] suffers the disadvantage [13] in that it supports AND-gate
policies with single positive value without wildcards. Chen et al. [14] proposed
two CP-ABE constructions, which support AND-gate policies with positive and
negative attribute values and wildcards. Zhang et al. [15] proposed a CP-ABE
scheme supporting AND-gate policies with multiple attribute values and wildcards.
Very recently, Li et al. [16] have proposed a data deduplication technique suitable
for cloud storage. As a promising technique, data deduplication has been widely
adopted in cloud storage to save storage resources and bandwidth. There are also
many other ABE constructions, such as multi-authority ABE [17, 18], outsourced
ABE [19, 20, 21], anonymous ABE [22, 23, 24, 25], and traceable ABE [26, 27, 28],
etc. In the multi-authority ABE scheme [17], any polynomial number of attribute
authorities are allowed to control attributes and issue attribute secret keys. It is
worth noting that these authorities are mutually independent. A data owner can
encrypt his/her data so as to a user can decrypt the corresponding ciphertext only
if he/she has particular attributes controlled by an attribute authority. Certainly,
multi-authority ABE schemes must resist the collusion attacks of multiple malicious
attribute authorities. In outsourced ABE schemes, intensive computing tasks during
encryption and decryption phases are outsourced to cloud servers without revealing
any private data or secret keys. Outsourced ABE has wide applications considering
the mobile cloud computing environment. It enables resource-constrained users to
complete heavy computation tasks with the help of cloud servers. Different from
traditional ABE schemes, outsourced ABE has to introduce corresponding outsourc-
ing servers. In the outsourced ABE scheme [20], secure outsourced decryption and
key distribution are realized. In anonymous ABE schemes, access policies informa-
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tion is not revealed in ciphertexts. Therefore, any people cannot learn of policy
information from ciphertexts, and even legitimate decryptors fail to guess what ac-
cess policies are adopted by encryptors. Anonymous ABE can realize users’ privacy
protection and hence it has a wide range of applications. Particularly, in the anony-
mous ABE scheme [25], a novel technique called match-then-decrypt is proposed, in
which a matching phase is additionally introduced before the anonymous decryption
phase. The match-then-decrypt technique can significantly improve the efficiency in
decryption phase of anonymous ABE. ABE with attribute hierarchies further realize
the expressiveness of access policies.
Furthermore, efficient revocation mechanisms are indispensable for ABE schemes
in that some secret keys might get compromised at some point. Yu et al. [29] pro-
posed a CP-ABE scheme supporting immediate attribute revocation mechanism
with the help of a semi-trusted proxy server. Yang et al. [30] proposed an attribute
revocation method to cope with the dynamic changes of users’ access privileges.
However, all the above ABE schemes only support indirect revocation, that is, the
attribute authority indirectly enables revocation by forcing revoked users to be un-
able to update their secret keys. Direct revocation enjoys a desirable property
that revocation can be done without affecting any non-involved users. Attrapadung
et al. [31] suggested two directly user-revocable CP-ABE schemes by combining the
techniques of ABE and broadcast encryption (BE). Since Fiat et al. [32] first intro-
duced the notion of BE, Boneh et al. [33] proposed a collusion resistant BE scheme,
which features short ciphertexts and private keys and is adopted in our construction
to realize direct user revocation. There are many other researches on revocation,
offline computation and policy update [34, 35, 36]. However, the computation cost
of the above schemes linearly increases with the complexity of access structures and
the number of revoked users.
3 PRELIMINARIES
3.1 Cryptographic Background
Definition 1 (Bilinear pairing). Let G be a cyclic multiplicative group of a prime
order p, g ∈R G be a generator, and GT be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same
order, identity of which we denote as 1. We call ê a bilinear pairing if ê : G×G→ GT
is a map with the following properties:
1. Bilinear: ê(ga, gb) = ê(g, g)ab for all a, b ∈ Z∗p.
2. Non-degenerate: There exists g1, g2 ∈ G such that ê(g1, g2) 6= 1.
3. Computable: ê(g1, g2) can be efficiently computed for all g1, g2 ∈ G.
Definition 2 (Decision (t, ε, `)-BDHE assumption). Security of our construction is
based on a complexity assumption called the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent as-
sumption (BDHE). Let G be a bilinear group of prime order p, and g, h two in-
dependent generators of G. Denote −→y g,α,` = (g1, g2, · · · , g`, g`+2, · · · , g2`) ∈ G2`−1,
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where gi = g
(αi) for some unknown α ∈ Z∗p. An algorithm B that outputs µ ∈ {0, 1}
has advantage ε in solving the decision `-BDHE problem if
|Pr[B(g, h,−→y g,α,`, ê(g`+1, h)) = 1]− Pr[B(g, h,−→y g,α,`, Z) = 1]| ≥ ε.
We say that the decision (t, ε, `)-BDHE assumption holds in G if no t-time algorithm
has advantage at least ε in solving the decision `-BDHE problem in G.
3.2 Access Policy
Usually, notation L |= W is used to represent the fact that the attribute list L
satisfies the access policy W , and the case of L does not satisfy W is denoted by
L 6|= W . In our construction, we consider AND-gate policy supporting multiple
attribute values and wildcards, which is a generalization of the access policy in [4]
and is also adopted in [23]. Formally, given an attribute list L = [L1, L2, · · · , Ln]
and an access policy W = [W1,W2, · · · ,Wn] =
∧
i∈IW Wi, where IW is a subscript
index set and IW = {i|1 ≤ i ≤ n,Wi 6= ∗}, we say L |= W if Li = Wi or Wi = ∗ for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and L 6|= W otherwise. Note that the wildcard ∗ in W plays the role
of “do not care” value.
4 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND ADVERSARY MODEL
4.1 System Architecture
As shown in Figure 1, the system architecture of access control in cloud computing
consists of four entities AA (Attribute Authority), CSP (Cloud Service Provider),
DO (Data Owner), and DU (Data User).
AA is an entity who generates public parameters and master secret keys for the
system. It is in charge of issuing attribute secret keys for users. It is fully trusted
by all entities joining the system.
CSP is an entity that hosts the encrypted files of DO. It consists of cloud storage
servers and a data service manager. Encrypted files from data owners are stored
in cloud storage servers. The data service manager is in charge of controlling
the accesses from outside users to the encrypted files.
DO is an entity who owns files, and wishes to upload them to the cloud storage
servers provided by CSP. It is responsible for defining attribute-based access
policy, and enforcing it on its own files by encrypting the files under the access
policy before uploading them.
DU is an entity who intends to access the encrypted files hosted in the cloud stor-
age servers. If DU is not revoked and his/her attributes match the underlying
access policy in the encrypted files specified by DO, then he/she will succeed in
decrypting the encrypted files.










Figure 1. System architecture of access control in cloud computing
We give an overview of access control in cloud computing.
System Setup. AA generates public parameters and master secret keys for the
system, and keeps master secret keys secretly.
User Registration. When a user wants to join the system, AA issues attribute
secret keys to him/her based on his/her attributes.
New File Creation. When DO wants to share a file with some users, he/she en-
crypts the file under a specific access policy and uploads the resulted ciphertext
to CSP.
File Access. When DU wants to access an outsourced file, he/she downloads the
ciphertext from CSP and decrypts it.
4.2 Adversary Model and Security Goals
Similar to the previous systems, CSP is assumed to be honest-but-curious. In our
system, the adversary is modeled as users colluding with CSP. The security goal is
semantic security of data and it is reflected in the following three security require-
ments.
Data Confidentiality. Unauthorized DU who does not have enough attributes
matching the access policy specified for a ciphertext by DO should be prevented
from accessing the plaintext of the files. In addition, unauthorized access from
CSP to the plaintext of the encrypted files should also be prevented.
Collusion-Resistance. If multiple DU and CSP collude, they may be able to ac-
cess the plaintext of an encrypted file by combining attributes even if each of
them cannot decrypt encrypted files alone. In practical attribute-based data
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sharing systems, these colluders should not succeed in decrypting encrypted
files.
Revocation. Any user involved in a revocation event fails to access the plaintext
of subsequent ciphertexts exchanged after he/she is revoked from the system.
5 BUILDING BLOCK CP-ABE
5.1 Definition of CP-ABE
A CP-ABE scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
Setup(1λ) → (PK,MK): On input a security parameter λ, it returns the system
public key PK which is distributed to DO and DU, and the master key MK
which is kept private.
KeyGen(PK,MK,L)→ SKL: On input the system public key PK, the master
key MK and an attribute list L, it outputs SKL as the attribute secret key
associated with L.
Encrypt(PK,M,W,R)→ CTW : On input the system public key PK, a message
M , an access policy W specified by DO and a revocation set R issued by AA,
it generates a ciphertext CTW as the encryption of M with respect to W and
R, which is outsourced to CSP. Note that R specifies the users who are revoked
from the system.
Decrypt(PK,CTW , SKL)→M or ⊥: On input the system public key PK, a ci-
phertext CTW of a message M under W and R, and a secret key SKL associated
with L, it outputs the message M if the user is not revoked and L |= W , and
the error symbol ⊥ otherwise.
5.2 Formalized Security Models for CP-ABE
In the proof of our construction, we adopt a security model called indistinguishability
against selective ciphertext-policy and adaptively chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-
sCP-CCA2), which is demonstrated in the following IND-sCP-CCA2 game.
Init: The adversaryA commits to a challenge ciphertext policyW ∗ and a revocation
information set R∗.
Setup: The challenger S chooses a sufficiently large security parameter λ, and runs
the Setup algorithm to get a master key SK and the corresponding system public
key PK. It retains SK and gives PK to A.
Phase 1: In addition to hash queries, A issues a polynomially bounded number of
queries to the following oracles:
• KeyGen Oracle OKeyGen: A submits an attribute list L, if L 6|= W ∗, S
gives A the secret key SKL and outputs ⊥ otherwise.
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• Decrypt Oracle ODec: A submits a ciphertext CTW of a message M . If
CTW is well-formed, S returns the message M . Otherwise, ⊥ is returned.
Challenge: Once A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs two equal length
messages M0 and M1 from the message space, on which it wishes to be challenged
with respect to W ∗ and R∗. The challenger S randomly chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1},
computes CTW ∗ = Encrypt(PK,Mb,W
∗,R∗) and sends CTW ∗ to A.
Phase 2: The same as Phase 1, except that CTW ∗ may not be submitted for oracle
ODec.
Guess: A outputs a guess bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if b′ = b. The advantage
of A in the IND-sCP-CCA2 game is defined as follows:
AdvIND−sCP−CCA2CP−ABE (A) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Definition 3. A CP-ABE scheme is said to be IND-sCP-CCA2 secure if no prob-
abilistic polynomial-time adversary can break the IND-sCP-CCA2 game with non-
negligible advantage.
6 PROPOSED ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM
6.1 Main Idea
In the proposed scheme, the decryption cost is constant and it does not linearly
increase with the complexity of access policies. The scheme can support AND-gate
access policies with multiple values and wildcards and it is IND-sCP-CCA2 secure.
In order to realize constant decryption cost, we use the idea of ciphertext aggrega-
tion. That is, in the new file creation phase, DO generates ciphertext components
by aggregating the system public key components which are specified by the at-
tribute values in access policies. To allow authorized DU to decrypt ciphertexts,
in the user registration phase, AA generates attribute secret key components for
attribute values appeared in the attribute list of DU. In the file access phase, to suc-
cessfully decrypt a ciphertext, DU just uses some attribute secret key components
in his/her secret key which are specified by values of the access policy. In order to
efficiently support AND-gate access policies with multiple values and wildcards, AA
only chooses three master secret key components in the system setup phase. Then,
for each attribute value, a system public key component is generated by binding
the attribute index with a master secret key component based on hash functions.
For the sake of CCA2 security, the last ciphertext component is generated from the
first three ciphertext components based on a random factor and system public key
components. Based on the bilinear pairing, the last ciphertext component helps to
answer decryption queries in security proof.
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6.2 Our Scheme
In this section, we present an access control system. Let G and GT be two cyclic
multiplicative groups of a prime order p. Also, let g be a generator of G and
ê : G × G → GT be a bilinear map. Suppose the attribute set of the system is
U = {ω1, ω2, · · · , ωn}. Attribute ωi has ni values and Si = {vi,1, vi,2, · · · , vi,ni} is
the multi-value set. Define collision-resistant hash functions H0 : Z∗p×{0, 1}∗ → Z∗p,
H1 : Z∗p → G, and Ĥ : {0, 1}∗ ×GT ×G2 → Z∗p. The system is described as follows.
System Setup. AA chooses a security parameter λ and runs the following algo-
rithm Setup of CP-ABE to generate a public parameter PK and a master secret
key MK for the system. Then AA publishes PK and keeps MK secretly.
• Setup(1λ): AA chooses x, y ∈R Z∗p, and computes Xi,ki = g−H0(x||i||ki), Yi,ki =
ê(g, g)H0(y||i||ki) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ ki ≤ ni. It also chooses α, β ∈R Z∗p
and sets v = gβ. Suppose the total number of users in the system is bounded
above by some natural number m. For notational simplicity, we let Im =
{1, 2, · · · ,m} in the following. For 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m and i 6= m+ 1, AA computes
gi = g
(αi). In addition, AA chooses δ1, δ2, δ3 ∈ G. Finally, the system public
key is published by AA as
PK = 〈g, {Xi,ki , Yi,ki}1≤i≤n,1≤ki≤ni , {gi}1≤i≤2m,i 6=m+1, v, δ1, δ2, δ3〉,
and the master key is MK = 〈x, y, β〉.
User Registration. When a user with an attribute list L wants to join the system,
AA runs the following algorithm KeyGen of CP-ABE to obtain an attribute secret
key SKL and gives it to the user.
• KeyGen(PK,MK,L): AA chooses sk ∈R Z∗p for the user. Then for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
suppose Li = vi,ki , AA computes
σi = σi,ki = g
H0(y||i||ki)H1(sk)
H0(x||i||ki).
Also, AA computes d = gβsn, where sn ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m} is a serial number
and it is used by AA to indicate that the current user is the snth one to
join the system. Finally, the corresponding attribute secret key is SKL =
〈sn, sk, {σi}1≤i≤n, d〉.
New File Creation. Whenever DO wants to upload a file F to CSP, he/she choo-
ses a symmetric key K and encrypts F with K based on a typical symmetric en-
cryption scheme such as AES to obtain a ciphertext CT0. Then DO defines a ci-
phertext policy W for F , and runs the following algorithm Encrypt of CP-ABE
to encrypt K to get a ciphertext CTW . Finally, DO sets CTF = {CT0, CTW}
and uploads CTF to CSP.
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• Encrypt(PK,M,W,R): Suppose Wi = vi,ki , in order to encrypt a message
M = K under a ciphertext policy W =
∧
i∈IW Wi such that the revoked
users specified by R cannot access it, DO computes









where 〈X i, Y i〉 = 〈Xi,ki , Yi,ki〉. Then, DO chooses s, ŝ ∈R Z∗p, computes KR =
ê(g1, gm)










s, C2 = X
s
W , ĥ = Ĥ(W ||C0||C1||C2), and C3 = (δĥ1 δŝ2δ3)s. Finally, DO
sets CTW = 〈C0, C1, C2, C3, CR, ŝ〉. Note that the ciphertext policy W and
revocation information R are implicitly included in ciphertexts.
File Access. Whenever DU with an attribute secret key SKL wants to access
and retrieve an outsourced file, he/she firstly downloads the ciphertext CTF =
{CT0, CTW} from CSP. Then DU computes K = Decrypt(PK,CTW , SKL) by
running the following Decrypt algorithm, and then retrieves the file F by sym-
metric decryption based on K. It is worth noting that DU can successfully
recover F if and only if L |= W and he/she is not revoked.
• Decrypt(PK,CTW , SKL): Suppose CTW = 〈C0, C1, C2, C3, CR, ŝ〉 corres-
ponding to W and R, and W =
∧
i∈IW Wi with Wi = vi,ki . Then CTW is
decrypted by DU with an attribute secret key SKL = 〈sn, sk, {σi}1≤i≤n, d〉 as
follows. DU first checks whether L |= W and sn 6∈ R. If not, the decryption
algorithm returns ⊥. Otherwise, DU checks whether ê(g, C3) = ê(C1, δĥ1 δŝ2δ3)
and ê(g, C2) = ê(C1, XW ) or not, where ĥ = Ĥ(W ||C0||C1||C2) and XW =∏
i∈IW Xi,ki . If one of the two equations does not hold, return ⊥. Otherwise,











Finally, the message is recovered as M = K = C0
ê(σW ,C1)ê(H1(sk),C2)KR
.
The process of outsourcing and access is shown in Figure 2.
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· run AES(K,F) to obtain CT0
· run Encrypt(PK,K,W,R) to obtain CTW
DO DUCSP
CT = (CT0, CTW )
CT = (CT0, CTW )
· run Decrypt(PK,CTW , SKL) to obtain K
· run AES(K,CT0) to obtain F
Figure 2. The process of outsourcing and access
7 ANALYSIS OF OUR ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM
7.1 Correctness
If L |= W and the user associated with sn is not revoked, the ciphertext can be




























m+1s = ê(g1, gm)
s.
Suppose the indexes satisfy Li = vi,ki , then
C0
ê(σW , C1)ê(H1(sk), C2)KR
=
MY sW ê(g1, gm)
s
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7.2 Security Analysis
We only need to prove the building block CP-ABE scheme is semantically-secure,
which is demonstrated in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Assume that A makes at most qH1 queries to the random oracle H1,
at most qK queries to the key generation oracle, and at most qD queries to the
decryption oracle. If the decision (τ, ε,m)-BDHE assumption holds in G, then the
proposed scheme is (τ ′, ε′,m)-secure, where τ ′ = τ+O(qH1+mqK+qD+N)τ1+O(qD+
N)τ2+O(qD)τp with N =
∑n
i=1 ni, and ε
′ = ε− qD
p
. Here, τ1 and τ2 denotes the time
complexity to compute an exponentiation in G and GT , respectively. τp represents
the time complexity of a pairing operation.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a τ -time adversary A, which breaks the proposed
scheme with AdvIND−sCP−CCA2CP−ABE (A) ≥ ε. We build a simulator S that has advantage
ε in solving the decision m-BDHE problem in G. S takes as input a random decision
m-BDHE challenge (g, h,−→y g,α,m, Z), where −→y g,α,m = (g1, g2, · · · , gm, gm+2, · · · , g2m)
and Z is either ê(gm+1, h) or a random element in GT . The simulator S plays the
role of the challenger in the IND-sCP-CCA2 game, and interacts with A as follows.
Init. The simulator S receives a challenge access structure W ∗ =
∧
i∈IW∗ Wi and
a revocation information set R∗ specified by the adversary A, where IW ∗ =
{i1, i2, · · · , iw} with ω ≤ n represents the attribute index set specified in W ∗.
During the game, A will consult S for answers to the random oracles H0, H1 and
Ĥ. Roughly speaking, these answers are randomly generated, but to maintain
the consistency and to avoid collisions, S keeps three tables L1, L2 and L̂ to
store the answers used.
Setup. S needs to generate a system public key PK. S firstly chooses j∗ ∈R
{1, 2, · · · , w} and x, x′, y, y′ ∈R Z∗p. Then, it does the following:
1. If ij ∈ IW ∗ − {ij∗}, suppose Wij = vij ,kij , then S computes(








Also, for k 6= kij , S computes(









2. For ij∗ , suppose Wij∗ = vij∗ ,kij∗ , then S computes(







t∈IW∗−{ij∗} gm+1−t, ê(g, g)
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Also, for k 6= kij∗ , S computes(









3. If ij /∈ IW ∗ , for 1 ≤ kij ≤ nij , S computes(




g−H0(x||ij ||kij ), ê(g, g)H0(y||ij ||kij )
)
.




ϕ2 , δ3 = g
φ3
1 g
ϕ3 . Note that δ1, δ2, δ3 are distributed randomly. Also, S




, where U∗ ⊆ RW ∗ denotes
the target set of involved users to be challenged by A when revocation events oc-
cur. Finally, S sends PK = 〈g, {Xi,ki , Yi,ki}1≤i≤n,1≤ki≤ni , {gi}1≤i≤2m,i 6=m+1, v, δ1,
δ2, δ3〉 to A.
Phase 1. The adversary A makes the following queries.
• Hash Oracle OH0 and OĤ are answered in a trivial way.
• Hash Oracle OH1(sk): We consider there is not an item containing sk
in L1. If sk corresponds to an attribute list L in the key generation oracle,
S adds the entry 〈sk, gijgz〉 to L1 and returns gijgz, where z ∈R Z∗p and ij
is associated with L and satisfies Lij /∈ Wij . Otherwise, S randomly chooses
ij ∈R {1, 2, · · · , n}, z ∈R Z∗p, adds the entry 〈sk, gijgz〉 to L1 and returns
gijg
z.
• KeyGen Oracle OKeyGen(L): Suppose A summits an attribute list L in
a secret key query. If L 6|= W ∗, there must exist ij ∈ IW ∗ such that Lij /∈ Wij .
Without loss of generality, assume Lij = vij ,k̂ij
and Wij = vij ,kij . S chooses




For t 6= ij, S chooses z ∈R Z∗p and computes σt as follows:
Case 1. If t ∈ IW ∗ − {ij∗}, suppose Lt = vt,kt , S computes




Case 2. If t = ij∗ , suppose Lij∗ = vij∗ ,kij∗ , S computes σij∗ as







 (X ij∗ )−z.
Case 3. If t /∈ IW ∗ , suppose Lt = vt,kt , S computes
σt = σt,kt = g
H0(y||t||kt)(gijg
z)H0(x||t||kt).
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• Decryption Oracle ODec(CTW ): Suppose A summits CTW = 〈C0, C1,
C2, C3, CR, ŝ〉 where W =
∧
i∈IW Wi with Wi = vi,ki . S checks whether




2δ3) and ê(g, C2) = ê(C1, XW ) or not, where ĥ = Ĥ(W ||
C0||C1||C2), XW =
∏
i∈IW Xi,ki . If one of the two equations does not hold,
return ⊥. Furthermore, S checks if ĥ + ŝφ2 + φ3 = 0 holds. If so, S aborts.
Otherwise, S chooses sn ∈R {1, 2, · · · ,m}, sets γ = ĥ + ŝφ2 + φ3, Ĉ =






















Challenge. S sets xW ∗ =
∑ω
j=1H0(x||ij||kij) and yW ∗ =
∑w
j=1H0(y||ij||kij), and
defines 〈XW ∗ , YW ∗〉 as follows:


























j=1H0(y||ij ||kij )+αm+1 .
Suppose A summits two messages M0 and M1 of equal length. S chooses b ∈R
{0, 1}, and computes C∗0 = MbZ2ê(g, h)yW∗ , C∗1 = h, and C∗2 = h−xW∗ . Then S
sets ĥ∗ = Ĥ(W ∗||C∗0 ||C∗1 ||C∗2), ŝ∗ =
−(ĥ∗+φ3)
φ2




















Fine-Grained Access Control for Resource-Constrained Users 341
It is noted that CTW ∗ = 〈C∗0 , C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , CR∗ , ŝ∗〉 is a valid encryption of Mb
whenever Z = ê(gm+1, h). On the other hand, when Z is a random element in
GT , CTW ∗ is independent of b in the adversary’s view.
Phase 2. Similar to Phase 1 with a restriction that A cannot query ODec(·) on
the challenge ciphertext CTW ∗ .
Guess. A outputs a guess bit b′ of b. If b′ = b, S outputs 1 in the decision m-BDHE
game to guess that Z = ê(gm+1, h). Otherwise, it outputs 0 to indicate that Z
is a random element in GT . We note that S will abort in decryption queries if
ĥ + ŝφ2 + φ3 = 0 holds. However, since the values φ2 and φ3 are respectively
hidden by blinding factors ϕ2 and ϕ3, A could not obtain any information on φ2
and φ3 from decryption queries, and hence the probability that ĥ+ ŝφ2 +φ3 = 0
occurs is at most 1
p
. Therefore, if Z = ê(gm+1, h), then CTW ∗ is a valid ciphertext
and we have











If Z is a random element in GT , the message Mb is completely hidden from A,
and we have Pr[S(g, h,−→y g,α,m, Z) = 1] = 12 .
Therefore, the simulator S has at least a non-negligible advantage ε − qD
p
in
solving the decision m-BDHE problem in G within time τ . It easily follows that
the time complexity of S is
τ ′ = τ +O
(















In this section, we analyze and compare the performance of the proposed scheme
with the previous CP-ABE schemes from the aspects of security and efficiency.
Table 1 shows the performance comparison in terms of the size of ciphertext (CT)
and the system public key (PK) size, the computation overheads of encryption and
decryption, the expressiveness of access policy, and the revocation mechanism. For
simplicity, we use e and p to represent an exponentiation operation and a pairing
operation, respectively. Let n be the total number of attributes in universe, s be
the number of attributes the user has to hold in order to match the access policy,
t be the number of attributes associated with the user’s secret key, sm and tm be the
maximum size allowed for s and t, m be the maximum number of users in the system,
r be the number of revocation events, and N be the total number of attribute values
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in the system. We denote the bit length of an element in a group G by |G|. In
addition, IAR and DUR respectively represent “Indirect Attribute Revocation” and
“Direct User Revocation”.
Schemes
Parameter Size Computation Cost
Policy Revocation
CT PK Encryption Decryption
HSM [12] 2|G| + |GT | (n + 4)|G| 3 e 2 p Type 1† ×
EM [13] 2|G| + |GT | (N + 2)|G| + |GT | 3 e 2 p Type 2‡ ×
CZF1 [14] 2|G| + |GT | 2n|G| + 2n|GT | 3 e 2 p Type 3§ ×
CZF2 [14] 3|G| + |GT | + |Z∗p| (2n + 3)|G| + 2n|GT | 6 e 6 p+2 e Type 3 ×
YWR [29] (n + 1)|G| + |GT | (3n + 1)|G| + |GT | (s + 2)e (n + 1)p Type 3 IAR
AI1 [31] (s + 2)|G| + |GT | (sm + tm + 2m + 1)|G| (2s + 3) e+1 p (2s + m + 1) p Type 4] DUR
AI2 [31] (s + 2r + 1)|G| + |GT | (sm + tm + 7)|GT | (2s + 2r + 2) e (2s + 2r + 1) p Type 4 DUR
Ours 4|G| + |GT | + |Z∗p| (N + 2m + 4)|G| + N|GT | 8 e 8 p+2 e Type 5
¶ DUR
† AND-gate policy supporting single positive value without wildcards.
‡ AND-gate policy supporting multiple values without wildcards.
§ AND-gate policy supporting positive and negative values with wildcards.
] Access structures based on linear secret sharing.
¶ AND-gate policy supporting multiple values with wildcards.
Table 1. Performance comparison of CP-ABE schemes
































Figure 3. Comparison of ciphertext length
From Table 1, we know that the CP-ABE schemes [12, 13, 14] and the proposed
scheme have small and constant computation cost. Although enjoying constant
computation cost, the schemes [12, 13, 14] fail to support revocation mechanisms.
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Figure 4. Comparison of decryption cost
Also, the access policies in [12] only support single attribute value. Furthermore, the
scheme [29] supports indirect attribute revocation, and only the schemes [31] and
the proposed scheme enjoy direct user revocation. However, the schemes [29, 31]
suffer an efficiency drawback that the encryption and decryption cost is not constant
in terms of the the number of e or p.
Based on the above analysis, we further compare schemes in [31] denoted as AI1,
AI2 and ours with respect to the ciphertext length in Figure 3. As for the ciphertext
length comparison, we set |G0| = |GT | = 160 bits and the number of revocation
events as r = 5. Note that the ciphertext length of the scheme AI2 is linearly
proportional to r. Both the ciphertext length of AI1 and AI2 linearly increases
with s. On the other hand, we do simulation experiments based on the Stanford
Pairing-Based Crypto (PBC) library [37] and a Linux machine with 3.30 GHz ×
8 Intel Xeon(R) E3-1230 CPU and 7.5 GB of RAM. The simulation results are
shown in Figure 4. In the simulation, the maximum number of users in the system
is set as m = 500. In order to precisely evaluate the decryption cost, a total
of 100 distinct access policies are generated, where each attribute has a positive
occurrence. For each access policy, the experiment is repeated for 30 times and
the final result is an average value. It is noted that both the decryption cost of the
scheme AI1 and AI2 linearly increases with the number of columns in access policies,
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and the proposed scheme enjoys small and constant decryption cost. Generally, we
argue that the proposed ABE scheme is more suitable for access control in cloud
computing.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an efficient data access control system in cloud computing.
The main building block is a new CP-ABE scheme, which enjoys constant computa-
tion cost and direct user revocation. The proposed access system is proven secure in
the random oracle model, and it can efficiently support AND-policy with multiple
attribute values and wildcards. Extensive performance comparisons indicate that
the proposed solution is extremely suitable for resource-constrained applications.
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